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INTRODUCTION
Our national securities markets' are supervised by a process characteristically described as "self-regulatory oversight."12 This phrase connotes a statutory relationship between the self-regulatory organizations
(SROs) and the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).3 Under a
commonly held perception of this relationship, the exchanges and the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) supervise their respective markets while the Commission asserts its reserve power only if
the SROs' initial exercise of authority is inadequate." An early chairman of the SEC, and later Supreme Court Justice, William 0. Douglas, provided what has become a widely quoted description of how the
self-regulatory oversight system is seen to operate. Justice Douglas said
that under self-regulation
[Tjhe exchanges take the leadership with Government playing a residual
role. Government would keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind the door,
loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it would never
have to be used.'
The term "securities markets" refers to both exchange and over-the-counter markets. The exchange markets are regulated by each exchange. The over-the-counter
market is regulated by the only regulatory securities association, the National Association of Securities Dealers [hereafter NASD]. Both the exchanges and the NASD are
referred to as self-regulatory organizations [hereafter SROs].
' This supervisory relationship was established by the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. V 1981) [hereafter 1934 Act]. In the
hearings conducted on the 1934 Act, the relationship between the exchanges and the
Commission was described as follows: "[T]he exchanges should be permitted or required to regulate themselves; but there should be Federal Authority holding the power
which in a previous administration would have been referred to as 'a big stick.'" Stock
Exchange Regulation: Hearing on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 544 (1934) (statement of Rep. Charles A. Wolverton) [hereafter 1934 House Hearing]. Nearly thirty
years after adoption of the 1934 Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission described the regulation of exchanges as consisting of "not merely self-regulation, but
self-regulation supervised by the Government." SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. DOC. NO. 95, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 502 (1963) [hereafter SPECIAL STUDY].
' Hereafter, also referred to as the Commission.
' In 1933, at President Roosevelt's direction, the Interdepartmental Committee on
Stock Exchange Regulation (the "Roper Committee") was formed and laid the foundation for the 1934 Act's self-regulatory framework. John Dickinson, Assistant Secretary
of Commerce and Chairman of the committee, envisioned the federal government as
holding the powers to regulate exchanges in "reserve to see that [sic] self-regulation is
exercised." 1934 House Hearing, note 2 supra, at 514.
1 W. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (1940) (speech delivered on May 20,
1938).
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Although Justice Douglas' analogy presents a picturesque image of
how self-regulatory oversight operates, the analogy is basically flawed.
It is flawed in part because the SEC, even at its inception, was intended to play more than a residual role in the regulation of the securities market regulatory process. Moreover, the Commission's role since
that time has been expanded, providing it with even greater direct responsibilities in regulating the securities markets.
Certainly, proponents of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
anticipated that the exchanges would be primarily responsible for their
own day-to-day regulation.' It is also clear, however, that the Commission was authorized to determine that some matters would be supervised directly by the government instead of the exchanges.' Even former
Chairman Douglas, in a statement cited less frequently than the familiar quote above, expressed "doubts" about the desirability of entrusting
exchanges entirely with "actual regulation and enforcement within
their own field." 8 He instead called for a "joint venture of the Commission and the exchanges" in assaulting certain undesirable practices of
the securities markets. 9
The Commission's market regulatory role, initially defined in 1934,
has been expanded in the past two decades both through Commission
practices and legislation. In the mid-1960s, responding to recommendations made in the SEC's Special Study of Securities Markets, the Commission began to assert more aggressively its "reserve" powers by seek' Although John Dickerson recognized the shortcomings of self-regulation during the
confirmation hearings preceding passage of the 1934 Act, he clearly favored exchange
self-regulation:
In framing a regulatory measure the practical problem of administration has always to be faced and when regulation gets beyond a certain
point the sheer ineffectiveness of attempting to exercise it directly through
the government on a wide scale counterbalances the fact that possibly the
exchanges might not be as diligent as we would wish them to be about
regulating themselves or as diligent as the government would be if the task
were compact enough to fall within the limits of effective government
performance.
1934 House Hearing, note 2 supra, at 514.
' See notes 25-29 and accompanying text infra. Professor Loss referred to the original statutory scheme of the original 1934 Act as providing "the Commission considerable discretion in the matter of drawing the line between self-regulation by the exchanges and direct governmental supervision." 2 L. LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION
1180 (2d ed. 1961).
, W. DOUGLAS, note 5 supra, at 64. This statement was released on November 23,
1937, six months prior to the "shotgun" speech.
I Id. at 66.
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ing to correct certain market abuses.'" Congress sanctioned this
broadened regulatory role in the Securities Reform Act of 1975." The
Commission's direct market regulatory authority was not only expanded in the area of rulemaking and discipline, but it was also assigned entirely new responsibilities in moulding the structure of the
newly mandated national market system. 2
Thus, the SEC's current role in regulating the securities markets is
not limited to mere oversight. Rather, the Commission also possesses
power to initiate market regulations on most significant issues that fre" For a discussion of the development of the Commission's expanded use of authority, see Jennings, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry: The Role of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 663, 665-67 (1964) [hereafter Jennings]. SEC Chairman William L. Cary, who headed the Commission during
the period of expansion, commented:
In sum, I do not agree that the Commission should have to resign itself
to a vestigal role in dealing with an exchange and its members. I feel we
must become directly involved, as we have in major disciplinary proceedings involving exchange members, where important questions of principle
are at stake.
Cary. Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry, 49 A.B.A. J. 244, 246 (1963).
" Securities Reform Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97. "The 1975 Act
provided a radical increase in the powers of the Commission over the rules of the selfregulatory organizations." N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS & T. RUSsO, REGULATION OF
BROKERS, DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS 12-22 (1973) [hereafter N. WOLFSON].
The 1975 Amendments were the outgrowth of both recommendations made twelve
years earlier in SPECIAL STUDY, note 2 supra, and two extensive studies conducted by
Congress in the early 1970s. See SUBCOMM. ON SECURITIES OF SENATE COMM. ON
BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, S. DOc. NO.
13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); SUBCOMM. ON COMMERCE AND FINANCE OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, SECURITIES INDUSTRY
STUDY, H.R. REP. NO. 1519, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
For a general discussion of the expanded Commission authority resulting from this
legislation, see N. WOLFSON, supra; Moylan, The Place of Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry, 6 SEC. REG. L.J. 49, 53-58 (1978).
12 In the legislative history of the 1975 Amendments, Congress expressed the expectation that:
[T]he SEC would be expected to play a much larger [regulatory] role than
it has in the past to ensure that there is no gap between self-regulatory
performance and regulatory need and, when appropriate, to provide leadership for the development of a more coherent and rational regulatory
structure to correspond to and to police effectively the new national market system.
SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, REPORT TO ACCOM.
PANY S.249, S.REP. NO. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975) [hereafter 1975 SENATE
REPORT].
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quently "overlap" the power of the SROs.' 3 This overlapping authority
affords the Commission an opportunity to respond to market regulatory
concerns in several different ways. The SEC can allow the SROs to
deal directly with regulatory concerns and thus involve itself in a traditional oversight capacity. Alternatively, in many instances, the Commission may choose to be the initiating regulatory body, using its direct or
indirect authority to effect its will.
This article will investigate what principles should guide the Commission in allocating decision making authority over regulatory matters
between itself and the SROs. When should the SEC initiate the resolution of issues? When should it merely oversee the efforts of the SROs
in issue resolution? Finally, can specific market regulatory problems be
analyzed pursuant to these principles to determine how decision making authority should be allocated? In addition to providing a model for
answering these questions, the guidelines 4 developed in this article will
also have relevance to the broader question of allocating decision making responsibility between the government and the private sector.
1.

CATEGORIES OF COMMISSION AUTHORITY

Before discussing how, decision making authority should be allocated
between the Commission and the SROs, it is necessary to analyze the
nature of the Commission's authority to regulate the securities markets
and then to examine the areas in which this authority overlaps that of
the SROs. For purposes of analysis, we may divide the Commission's
market regulatory authority into three broad categories: response, direct, and indirect control.
A.

Response or Pure Oversight Control

This is the classic oversight authority,' 5 exercised only in those instances in which the Commission is authorized to approve or disapprove action already taken by an SRO. For example, under Section
19(e) of the 1934 Act, the Commission is authorized to review discipli" This joint authority was characterized in the legislative history of the 1975
Amendments as "mutual regulatory responsibilitfy]" with the ultimate authority (perhaps only oversight authority) resting with the Commission. 1975 SENATE REPORT,
note 12 supra, at 23.
" These guidelines are not intended to be exclusive, but rather, to be suggestive of
subsequent models of allocating decision making.
" Although "response" authority is typically referrred to as "oversight" authority,
oversight is a broader concept which includes all categories of the Commission's regulatory authority over SROs.
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nary sanctions imposed by the SROs against respective members. 6 This
authority is activated only if the SRO sanctions a member pursuant to
the rules of the SRO. Under Section 19(e), the Commission may affirm
the sanctions after determining that: (i) the disciplined person has committed the acts for which he is sanctioned; (ii) that such acts violate the
1934 Act, its rules or regulations or the rules of the self-regulatory
organization; and (iii) that the sanctions are consistent with the purposes of the 1934 Act." When the Commission affirms the existence of
a violation, it may still modify the sanction if it is found to impose a
burden on competition or if it is excessive or oppressive. 8 Alternatively,
the Commission may not make such a finding and in such a case must
then set aside the sanction and, if it chooses, remand the matter to the
SRO.' 9 This review by the SEC may be initiated on its own motion or
upon request of a party subject to the disciplinary action.2 0 In either
instance, as with any Commission response authority, there must be an
initial action (here, a disciplinary sanction) taken by an SRO, to which
the Commission responds.
Of course, the Commission has response authority in areas other
than review of SRO discipline of its members. These include its power
to discipline SROs either for noncompliance with the 1934 Act, its
rules and regulations, for violation of the SRO's own rules, or for an
SRO's failure to enforce member compliance with any of these provi-

sions." The Commission's response 2 authority also includes power to
review SRO proposed rule changes. 1
Much of the Commission's response authority today represents a significant augmentation of the mandate that the Commission possessed
prior to 1975. For example, prior to the 1975 Amendments, the Commission exercised disciplinary review power only in respect to NASD
23
actions, not disciplinary actions taken by the exchanges.
" 15 U.S.C. § 78s(e) (1976).
IId.

" 15 U.S.C. § 78s(e)(2) (1976). The Supreme Court specifically suggested the need
for SEC review of exchange imposed sanctions because of their impact upon competition. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 359 (1963). Prior to 1975, no such
basis existed for reviewing exchange imposed sanctions.
" Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(e)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(e)(1)(B) (1976).
20 Id. § 19(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78a(d)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2- Id. § 19(h)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(1) (1976).
22 Id. § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1976).
23 Former Act § 15A(f) and (g) provided the Commission with this review authority
for the NASD prior to 1975. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(f) and (g) (1970) (amended by Pub. L.
No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975)). In 1963, the Special Study recommended a reexamination of the reasons for discrepancies between the Commission's powers over the ex-
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The review procedure of SRO proposed rule changes also represents
a significant increase in the response powers of the Commnission.
Before 1975, neither solicitation of public comment, nor filing by the
SRO of a justification for the proposed rule change, nor prior Commission approval of proposed changes, were required."4 This expansion of
response authority has increased the avenues available to the Commission for effecting specific policies, thus requiring further decision making by the Commission as to how to achieve its goals.
B.

Direct Control

The Commission also possesses authority to initiate its own resolution of specific concerns. Under its direct control authority it may effect
goals without employing the channels of the SROs (although effective
implementation of a Commission goal may well require SRO surveillance and enforcement).
The Commission's direct authority can be divided into two components: (i) authority to alter exchange rules without SRO involvement
and (ii) authority to promulgate its own rules to directly control securities market activities. " For example, under the first category, pursuant
to Section 19(c) of the 1934 Act, the Commission may "abrogate, add
to, and delete from" the rules of a SRO. If the governing rules of a
SRO do not comply with the Commission's vision of which subject matters should be covered or how these matters should be handled, the
Commission, after notice and an opportunity for interested persons to
be heard, may amend an exchange's or the NASD's own rules. 26 Under
changes and the NASD. SPECIAL STUDY, note 2 supra, pt. 4, at 726-27.
24 The prior act required only that an exchange furnish the Commission with a copy
of any amendments to its rules. See former Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 6(a)(4),
15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)(4) (1970) (amended by Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975)).
Even when the NASD had to make a prior filing with the Commission before adopting
rule changes, there was no mandated opportunity for public comment or any requirement of filing a jurisdiction for the rule. See former Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §
15(A)(j), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-30) (1970) (amended by Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97
(1975)). As a practical matter, the New York Stock Exchange would give the Commission prior notice of rule changes even before 1975. 1IA Pt. 1 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, SECURITIES REGULATION, FEDERAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, 2-24
n.4 (E. Gadsby, ed.) (MB) (1980).
" These categories roughly correspond to a similar analysis found in the legislative
history of the 1975 Amendments. 1975 SENATE REPORT, note 12 supra, at 131. However, the Senate Report included a third category which corresponded to what the text
identifies as indirect authority. See notes 30-32 and accompanying text infra.
2 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1976). It is~important to note that statutory provisions granting the Commission direct authority, Such as

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 16:527

the second category, the Commission may directly regulate securities
market activities through its own rules. Thus, when the Commission
restricts the price at which short sales may be effected, pursuant to
Rule 10a-1,27 it preempts this area of market regulation by direct action
through its own rules.
As with the SEC's oversight authority, the 1975 Amendments significantly expanded the Commission's direct authority. For example, former Section 19(b) of the 1934 Act, the predecessor of present Section
19(c) (authorizing the Commission to amend SRO rules), limited the
Commission's authority to alter exchange rules to twelve enumerated
categories. Present Section 19(c) is not so limited. Within these twelve
areas, the Commission could act only after making an "appropriate request in writing" to the exchange. Present Section 19(c) makes no such
demand on the Commission. The Commission's authority under former
Section 19(b) was more in the nature of oversight authority than direct
authority. Also, since 1975 the Commission has had direct authority to
enforce the rules of the SROs,28 and is no longer hampered by SRO
reluctance to pursue disciplinary problems. Prior to 1975, the Commis§ 19c, do not require a showing by the Commission of attempts to have the SROs
assume regulatory responsibility. The Commission's authority is original authority. In
the past, the Commission's direct authority was not similarly unfettered. Former §
19(b) required the Commission to make a written request to a securities exchange that
it effect a rule change before the Commission acted on its own to alter the exchange's
rules.
2" 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1 (1982).
2 Section 21(d) of the 1934 Act allows the SEC to enjoin violations of the SROs'
rules in federal district court. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976). Prior to 1975, the SEC could
seek injunctions only for violation of the 1934 Act or its own rules and regulations. See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(e), § 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970) (amended by
Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975)). The Commission's authority under § 21(d) is
partially direct authority because the SEC may act if it determines that such action is
(,necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(f) (1976). But, it is also oversight

authority in part because the Commission's alternative reason for initiating a § 21(d)
action would be the result of an SRO being "unable or unwilling to take appropriate
action." Id.
In 1971, the SEC found its authority was often insufficient to ensure fair and effective self-regulation because the SEC could not directly enforce the rules of the SROs.
See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND
PRACTICES OF BROKERS AND DEALERS, H.R. DOC. NO. 231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 41
(1971). The 1975 Amendments ameliorated this deficiency.
The 1975 Amendments also granted the Commission new authority to suspend or
expel SRO members for violation of the Securities Acts and the Commission's own
rules. Securities Exchange Act of 1939, § 19(h)(2), § 15 U.S.C. 78s(h)(1) 1976.
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sion could enforce its own rules, but not those of an exchange. Again,
this augmentation of direct authority of the Commission means that in
more instances the Commission's authority and that of the SROs will
overlap. Moreover, the Commission has multiple means of resolving
specific problems because the 1975 Amendments have also increased its
means of resolving issues."
C.

Indirect Control

Finally, the Commission has authority to compel SROs to adopt
rules for themselves. Under Rule 1 lb-1, 0 for example, the Commission
has dictated for which matters, regarding specialists, exchanges must
adopt rules.3'
Although indirect control requires Commission initiation, it obviously also requires exchanges to undertake rulemaking action in response to the Commission's dictates.32 The indirect authority approach
allows the SEC to set broad guidelines, while leaving details to those
who are closest to the issue, the SROs.
D.

Qualifications

The line dividing the categories of response, direct, and indirect control is not always clear. Although the Commission is usually initiating
regulatory action when it utilizes its direct authority, this authority
may also be employed in a response/oversight mode. Thus, if the Commission uses its Section 19(c) authority to amend an earlier promulgated SRO rule, the SEC is really responding (oversight action) to
SRO regulatory actions as opposed to initiating its own action (direct
action).
Alternatively, the Commission has also used its oversight authority to
initiate certain Commission policies. Thus, when the Commission chose
The legislative history of the 1975 Amendments shows that the expansion of the
SEC's direct authority was not meant to restrict its oversight authority. "Although Section 19(c) would give the SEC plenary power over self-regulatory rules, the section in
29

no way limits the SEC's ability to use its other powers ...

"

1975 SENATE REPORT,

note 12 supra, at 131.
30 17 C.F.R. § 240.11b-1 (1982).
" See e.g., Rule 104, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., CONSTITUTION AND
RULES (CCH) 1 2104 (1981). The New York Stock Exchange adopted its Rule 104 to
comply with the Commission's Rule 1lb-1.
2 The failure of an SRO to comply with the Commission's indirect authority may
lead to disciplinary action. The sanctions range in severity from censure to revocation of
registration. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(h)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h) (1976).
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to create a liberal policy of granting unlisted trading privileges,33 it was
in the granting of the application (essentially a response action) that the
Commission defined its policy for further applications (essentially an
initiating action).
Similarly, an "informal" use of Commission authority can blur the
boundaries between the various categories of authority. Rather than initiate its own rules or direct an SRO to adopt certain rules, the Commission has at times suggested to SROs that they adopt certain rules or
initiate specific practices. When the SEC has the authority to adopt the
requested rule or directly initiate the requested action were the SRO
not to comply, the Commission's "suggestion" is a powerful request."'
This informal use of direct authority, if effective in persuading a SRO
to act, is most similar to indirect authority.
E.' Classifying Market Regulatory Activities
For convenience of analysis, the Commission's exercise of its several
types of authority will be examined in terms of three broad areas of
regulatory activities: (i) rulemaking and order granting; (ii) discipline;
and (iii) policy setting. If defined with sufficient breadth, these three
categories essentially cover all Commission activities in the field of market regulation. They are not intended to be mutually exclusive, but
rather overlapping in part. Thus, rulemaking and order granting activity, in some instances, can also be policy setting activity. An example,
as discussed above, is when the Commission wanted to set a liberal
policy of granting unlisted trading privileges to regional exchanges" to
" See Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 16422 (Dec. 12, 1979), [1979-80 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,657, 18 SEC DOCKET 1323 (Dec. 26, 1979).
See notes 35-37 and accompanying text infra.
" See Jennings, note 10 supra, at 664 n.7 (Commission's implied threat of its direct
authority for rulemaking encouraged the New York Stock Exchange to adopt its own
rules regulating floor trading); Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 7330 (1964); Kripke,
The SEC, Corporate Governance and the Real Issues, 36 BUS. LAW. 173, 188-89
(1981) (analysis of Commission's pressure on exchanges to require listed companies to
establish independent audit committees); Comment, Informal Bargaining Process: An
Analysis of the SEC's Regulation of the New York Stock Exchange, 80 YALE L.J. 811,
816-30 (1971) (discussing informal use of direct authority).
" See text accompanying note 33 supra. A "regional exchange" or "regional" is any
national stock exchange other than the two exchanges in New York City. These include: the Boston Stock Exchange (BSE), Cincinnati Stock Exchange (CSE), Midwest
Stock Exchange (MSE), Pacific Stock Exchange (PSE), and the Philadelphia Stock
Exchange (PHLX). The two stock exchanges in New York City, the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) are referred to as the
"primary exchanges." Major domestic corporations typically are listed on the primary
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encourage competition between regional and primary exchanges (a policy setting activity). 3" It granted an order approving an omnibus application for unlisted trading privileges by a regional exchange (a
rulemaking or order granting activity), and through the order described
its liberal policy."
Rulemaking and discipline may similarly be intertwined. The Commission will employ its disciplinary authority to enforce its rulemaking
actions. Thus, failure of an exchange and brokerage firm to comply
with the Commission's quote rule38 (rulemaking activity), a rule considered central to the national market system,39 has led to censure of both
an exchange and a brokerage house4" (disciplining activity). Although
these activities overlap, they are separate components in terms of analysis of Commission activity.
II.

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL OVERLAP BETWEEN TYPES OF
COMMISSION AUTHORITY

For the vast majority of issues of market regulatory concern, whether
involving rulemaking and order granting, discipline or policy setting,
the Commission has means of effecting its will through direct, indirect,
stock exchanges, pursuant to §§ 12(a) and 12(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(a)
and (b) (1976). Often, these major corporations are not inclined to be listed on the
regional exchanges. However, these corporations' securities can still be traded on the
regional exchanges if the exchanges are granted "unlisted trading privileges" under
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(0, 15 U.S.C. § 78(l) (1976).
,6 Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 16422 (Dec. 12, 1979), [1979-80 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,657, 18 SEC DOCKET 1323 (Dec. 26, 1979).
" The MSE applied for unlisted trading privileges in 910 companies with primary
listings on the NYSE. The number of companies for which unlisted trading privileges
were being sought was roughly one hundred times greater than the number for which
requests had been made in any previous application. The size of this request compelled
the Commission to spend more than two years examining its unlisted trading privileges
policy. During that time no unlisted trading privileges were granted to any exchange.
" Rule IlAcl-I, 17 C.F.R. § 240.11Acl3-1 (1982).
, See Lipton, Best Execution: The National Market System's Missing Ingredient,
57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 449, 458-60, 483-85 (1982) (discussing significance of quote
rule to national market system).
0 The PHLX was censured for violating the quote rule in failing to establish and
maintain adequate procedures to collect, process, and make available reliable quotations
from its members. Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 16648 (Mar. 3, 1980), 19 SEC
DOCKET 876 (Mar. 25, 1980).
The SEC found Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. in violation of the quote rule when,
as a specialist on the PHLX, it failed to report quotations in certain securities. Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 16808 (May 15, 1980), 20 SEC DOCKET 14 (May 27,
1980).
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or response authority."2 For every instance in which the Commission
has this multiplicity of authority it can choose to either initiate a course
of action to resolve a problem or respond to action initiated by an SRO
to resolve a problem. If the Commission chooses to initiate action, it
might use its direct, indirect, or in some cases, its response authority. 3
If the Commission chooses to respond to SRO action rather than initiate its own, it might use its response authority, or fail to respond
(which may be viewed as a type of response)."' Obviously, for every
instance in which the SEC has response authority, the SROs have the
authority to effect their will (at least until the SEC responds) through
initiating action."5 Thus, for many, if not most matters that fall under
the purview of the SEC's authority, its authority and the authority of
the SROs partly overlap.
Each time the Commission exercises its market regulatory authority
it must decide, either explicitly or implicitly, how best to resolve an
issue - whether to respond to regulatory activity or initiate it. If the
Commission chooses to initiate the activity, it must also make a decision
as to what type of initiating authority it should employ.
An example of the overlapping authority can be found in the area of
42 The SEC has no direct authority over some obvious market regulatory matters.
For example, the SEC has no direct or indirect authority to file a registration application for an SRO or to adopt the initial rules of an SRO. Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a), (1976). Id. § 15A, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1976). Of
course, the SEC has response authority to pass upon such applications. Id. § 19(a)(1),
15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(1) (1976). The SEC has no direct authority to approve applications
for membership to an exchange. Id. § 6(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(2) (1976). The SEC
can, however, deny membership. Id. § 6(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c)(2) (1976). Moreover,
the SEC can review the membership decision made by exchanges. Id. §§ 19(d)(1),
19(0, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(d)(1), 78s(f) (1976).
,' When answering an application from an SRO, the Commission may use its response authority to indicate its futpre response to similar applications, thus setting a
policy.
" Congress intends that for sorae regulatory matters no Commission response to
SRO action is necessary. Thus,, if an SRO files a rule change pursuant to §
19(b)(3)(A), which is intended onl' to interpret a present rule, establish or change a
fee, or deal with internal administrative matters, the rule may become effective without
any Commission approval. Securiies Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 19(b)(1)(3)(A), 15
U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3)(A) (1976). The Commission has response authority to "abrogate"
such SRO rule changes if it acts within 60 days of their filing. Id. § 19(b)(3)(C), 15
U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3)(C) (1976).
" As with the Commission, an SRO lacks formal initiating authority over some obvious matters. For example, only the Commission can relieve an SRO of specific regulatory functions by rule or order. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 17(d)(1)(A), 15
U.S.C. § 78q(d)(1)(A) (1976).
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rulemaking affecting specialists. Exchanges, pursuant to Sections
6(b)(5) and 19(b), may propose rules regulating numerous matters, including the behavior of specialists." The Commission responds to these
proposals by approving or disapproving them pursuant to Section
19(b), thus employing its oversight authority.47 Alternatively, the Commission could initiate its own regulation of specialists, regardless of
whether an exchange has already chosen to act, by pursuing one of two
courses of action. First, under Section 11(b), the Commission may
adopt rules that would delineate the content of what must be contained
in exchange rules regulating the behavior of specialists.4" This use of
indirect authority requires that the Commission initiate action. Second,
Section 19(c) allows the SEC to act directly to amend the rules of an
exchange to provide for regulation of specialists as the Commission
finds acceptable. This use of direct authority also requires Commission
initiation.
Similarly, in this area of discipline, the Commission has authority to
deal with SRO rule violations by SRO member brokers: (i) directly by
injunction under Section 21(d) of the 1934 Act;4 9 (ii) indirectly by disci-

plining the SRO for failing to enforce its own rules pursuant to Section
19(h)(1);" or (iii) responsively by reviewing SRO disciplinary proceedings pursuant to Section 19(e)."
As a final example, in the area of policy setting the Commission
could require that the national market system be structured so as to
compel participating brokers to provide best execution for all customers
who execute transactions within this system. 2 Consistent with the
Commission's mandate to facilitate establishment of the National Mar4"

15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(5), 78s(b) (1976).

Sections 19(b)(l) and (2) of the 1934 Act require the Commission to publish SRO
proposed rule filings, to allow interested persons an.opportunity to submit comments,
and to either approve the proposed rule or institute proceedings to determine its disapproval. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(l), (2) (1976).
' Pursuant to § 11 (b), the Commission has adopted Rule 11 b-1. See Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 7465 (Jan. 4, 1965). Rule llb-1 dictates that exchange rules
contain the following requirements: (i) that specialists maintain adequate minimum
capital; (ii) that specialists engage in efforts to maintain fair .and orderly markets and to
limit other activities; (iii) that there be provisions stating the responsibilities of a specialist when acting as a broker; and (iv) that there be procedures established to provide
for surveillance of specialists. 17 C.F.R. § 240.11b-1 (1982).
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976).
Id. § 78s(h)(1) (1976).
, Id. § 78s(e) (1976).
S2 See generally Lipton, note 39 supra, at 449-63 (discussing significance of best
execution to national market system).
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ket System and to carry out its objectives, including assuring the practicability of best execution," the Commission could require a best execution practice by brokers. It could use its direct authority, for example,
by adopting a Commission rule under Section 10(b)"4 of the 1934 Act
making it a manipulative practice for brokers to fail to seek best execution. The Commission could also act through indirect authority, pursuant to Section 1 IA(a)(3)(b), and require SROs to adopt appropriate
rules to effect best execution of customer orders.55 Finally, the Commission could respond to policy setting of the SROs by passing upon rules
promulgated by the SROs to achieve a best execution practice.' In the
last instance, the exchange would be initiating its policy through
rulemaking activity.
These selected instances of overlapping authority between the Commission and the SROs are illustrated in the following chart:
SELECTED INSTANCES OF OVERLAPPING

REGULATORY AUTHORITY
Regulatory
Activity

SEC Initiating
Authority (Direct)
2

SEC Initiating
Authority (Indirect)

SEC Response
Authority

SRO Initiating
Authority

I 6(b)(6) (exchanges
required to adopt
rules establishing
their own
disciplinary
mechanism) & I
19(g)(1) (exchanges
compelled to direetly enforce
disciplinary rules)

Discipline
(generally,
SRO
members
violating
SRO rules)

If 21(a) & 1(e) (covers SRO
rules & Sec.Acts violations)
or I 19(h)(2) (covers only Sec.
Acts violations)

I 19(h)(1)(A)
(disciplining
exchanges for
enforcement
failures) & I 19(h)
(4) (disciplining
exchange officers
for enforcement
failures)

If 19(e)(l)(A),

Rulemaking
and Order
Granting
(specifically
regulating
specialists)

If 19(c) (altering exchange
rules) & 10(a) (adopting its
own rules affecting exchange
trading)

I 11(b) & Rule
llb-I(a)(2)(ii)
(determining
nature of exchange
rules dealing with
specialists)

I 19(b)(2)
(approving
exchange rule
proposals)

f 19(b)(1), (2)
(SEC approval
needed)&
19(b)(3)(A) (no SEC
approval neededif
perfunctory)

Policy
Setting
(specifically,
establishing
national
market
system goal
of best
execution)

IfI IA(a)(1)(C)(iv), I IA(a)(2)
(authority to facilitate
establishment of the national
market system and goal of
assuring best execution) &
§10(b) (authority to define
manipulative practices to
include failure to seekbest
execution)

§ I IA(a)(3)(B)

I 19(b)(2)
(responding to
rulemaking for
policy ends by
SROs)

4 19(b)(1), (2) (use
of rulemaking for
policy ends) (f
IIA(a)(2) doesnot
exclude SRO
initiatives)

(authority to direct
SRON to act in
regulating a
national market
system)

(B) & 19(e)(2)
(reviewing
exchange
disciplinary
sanctions)

"' Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 1lA(a)(1)(C)(iv), 11A(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§
78k-1(a)(1)(C)(iv), 78k-1(a)(2) (1976).
" Id. 10(b)5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(3)(b) (1976).
" In 1981, the Commission in fact approved exchange rule proposals establishing an
anti-trade-through rule which was designed to encourge best execution in some instances. Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 17703 (Apr. 9, 1981). See Lipton, note 39
supra, at 504-05 (anlysis of anti-trade-through rule).
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A.

Allocating Regulatory Responsibilities
DETERMINING WHO SHOULD EXERCISE WHICH AUTHORITY

Maximizing Efficiency in the Resolution of Significant Market
Regulatory Matters

Allocating guidelines can be developed within the scheme of the Securities Exchange Act to determine whether the SEC should initiate
regulatory activity or respond to the initiating efforts of an SRO. In
instances when the Commission chooses to initiate a resolution, these
guidelines can further suggest which authority it should employ.
To establish these guidelines for allocating regulatory authority three
assumptions must be stated. The first, developed above,57 is that regulation of securities trading markets is a cooperative effort performed by
both the SEC and the SROs. The second assumption suggests that a
basic presumption is built into the legislative scheme of self-regulation.
The term self-regulation implies that the responsibility for the day-today administration of the trading markets tests with the self-regulatory
bodies. This assumption is supported by examining the conditions prescribed for exchange registration. Exchanges will only be registered if
the Commission determines that the applicant exchange has the machinery necessary to carry on the mundane administration of an exchange such as admitting members,58 selecting directors fairly,59 assessing dues and fees,6" implementing fair trading,"' enforcing its rules,
disciplining violators,"2 and avoiding burdens on competition.' Clearly,
these perfunctory chores are within the province of the SROs' regulatory authority. The assumption in favor of SRO responsibility for basic
administration of the trading markets can also be deduced by examining the 1934 Act provisions governing rulemaking. These provisions
permit SROs to adopt rule changes without Commission approval only
for those matters dealing with other than significant market regulatory
issues such as administration of the exchanges, explanations of present
policies, and altering fee schedules.' If the proposed rule change deals
with other than these perfunctory matters, the Commission's approval
S7 See

note 13 and accompanying text supra.
" Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 6(b)(2), 6(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(2), (c)
(1976).
" Id. § 6(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(3) (1976).
60 Id. § 6(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(4) (1976).
" Id. § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (1976).
62 Id. §§ 6(b)(1), 6(b)(7), 6(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(1), (b)(7), (d) (1976).
63 Id. § 6(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(8) (1976).
I § 19(b)(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3)(A) (1976).
Id.
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is required.6"
Generally, for matters other than the daily administration of the
trading markets, that is, those markets regulating issues with broad implications for the ability of trading markets to perform their capital
formation and resource allocation functions, no comparable presumption exists in the statutory scheme that would establish jurisdiction for
the SROs. The Commission, as readily as the SROs, could supervise
the development of a component of the national market, modify the
specialist system, or correct persistent SRO member disregard of Commission or exchange rules. For significant market regulatory matters,
over which both the SEC and the SROs have potential authority, little
guidance exists as to whether the SEC or the SROs should exercise
initial regulatory authority.
The final assumption recognizes that the SROs represent an interest
group -

their respective memberships -

and the SEC does not. The

SROs are committed to executing the intent of the 1934 Act;66 and yet,
the exchanges are composed of members whose interests at times conflict with the goals of the 1934 Act.67 On the other hand, the SEC, an
independent, bipartisan, quasi-judicial government agency, is responsible for implementing the 1934 Act and represents no special interest
group."
The guidelines developed below accept the current legislative scheme
§§ 19(b)(1), (b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(b)(1), (b)(2) (1976).
be registered, § 6(b)(l) requires that an exchange must be so organized and
have the capacity to carry out the purposes of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(1)
(1976).
"7The Senate Report accompanying the bill that was to become the 1934 Act recognized that "however zealously exchange authorities may supervise the business conduct
of their members, the interests with which they are connected frequently conflict with
the public interests." SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY REPORT TO ACCOMPANY S.3420, S.REP. NO. 792, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1934) [hereafter 1934
SENATE REPORT].
6 Reliant upon Congress for operation and funding, the SEC is arguably more subject to political interests than the SROs. However, the SEC's bipartisan nature, its
recognized independence, and its own code of ethics, militate against the SEC being
responsive to political pressures. The bipartisan nature of the SEC is dictated by § 4(a)
of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (1976). The SEC's independence is well noted. See
3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1878-83 (2d ed. 1961). The SEC's Canon of Ethics exhorts its members to maintain their independence and "reject any effort by representatives of the executive or legislative branches of the government to affect their independent determination of any matter being considered by this Commission. A member
should not be swayed by partisan demands, public clamor or considerations of personal
popularity or notoriety; so also he should be above fear of unjust criticism by anyone."
61 Id.
6 To

17 C.F.R. § 200.58 (1982).
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and its enumerated assumptions and seek to maximize the utility of
each party in resolving significant market regulatory matters. Given the
intent of the legislation to allow either the SEC or the SROs to supervise many of the nonperfunctory market matters, the guidelines are
designed to divide regulatory duties, in instances of dual authority, in a
manner that ensures that the entity to whom responsibility is designated is the entity that has the greatest ability to regulate the matter. 9
Ability will be measured by two factors of efficiency: (i) the institutional resources that must be expended by the regulatory body70 in order to obtain a satisfactory resolution of any particular regulatory issue,7 1 and (ii) the likelihood that the institution can make its decision
".Essentially, the goal of the guidelines is to provide a cost-benefit structure to allocate the regulatory responsibility between the SROs and the SEC. The allocation will
be made on the basis of the resources each institution has to expend to resolve a specific
regulatory matter. Implicit in this cost-benefit analysis is an assumption that the marginal cost of administering market regulatory operations does not differ substantially between the SEC and the SRO. This assumption is probably neither proveable nor disproea ble and'is beyond the scope of this article. However, there is no reason to believe
'that marginal operational costs differ between the SEC and the SROs. Disproof of this
assumption would alter the conclusions reached below.
The criteria are intended to direct decision making responsibility in a manner that
will- resolve regulatory problems with the least expenditure of resources. In other
words, the criteria will guide the achievement of the greatest regulatory results (value)
per regulatory costs (resources). The economists would refer to these criteria as "efficiency criteria." See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10-12 (2d ed.
1977).
70 The guidelines also depend upon the assumption that the regulatory budgets of
the SEC and the SROs can ultimately be altered, if necessary, to reflect any increase or
decrease in regulatory responsibility created by a reallocation pursuant to the criteria.
If the criteria direct an efficient use of resources, concerns regarding the difference
between the source of funds of the SROs and the SEC may still exist. The SROs are
funded by the securities industry and ultimately, securities investors. The SEC is
funded by the government (i.e., the taxpayers) and through fees which are primarily
paid by parties who are assessed various registration, filing, and transaction fees. In
1980, 68% of the Commission's budget was funded by these fees. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE, 47TH ANNUAL REPORT 163 (1980). The funds of the SROs are contributed
by the Securities industry which, in turn, immediately benefits by the operations of the
SROs. The government's portion of the SEC's funds is contributed by taxpayers who,
in. general, do not immediately benefit from the SEC's operations. Recognizing the
closer identity between the immediate benefit of operations and source of funds which
identity characterizes the SROs, some critics may wish to see the SROs rather than the
SEC absorb a greater proportion of regulatory costs. This is, however, a social concern,
and. outside the scope of this article.
" The term satisfactory resolution assumes that there is a general concurrence
among observers of securities market regulations as to what constitutes a satisfactory
resolution of specific regulatory issues. At least, there should be general concurrence as
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free from the influence of conflicting interests that might prevent the
particular resolution of a specific problem from being in the best interests of the trading market."
Regarding the first factor, there is no reason to assume that either
the SEC or an SRO has inherently greater or lesser problem solving or
administrative abilities.73 Consequently, a priori predictions distinguishing the SEC and the SROs as regulators must be based upon a
factor other than their inherent regulatory abilities. The guidelines developed below will be used to distinguish the SEC and the SROs as
regulators based upon unique considerations arising from either (i) the
particular expertise a regulatory body could bring to bear on a specific
regulatory concern; (ii) the need, or absence thereof, for a uniform regulatory approach; or (iii) the presence or absence of duplicative efforts
that a regulatory body must expend when responding to a specific regulatory concern.
Regarding the second factor of avoiding conflicts of interest,74 and
to what would not be a satisfactory resolution. If neither of these assumptions is true,
the process of delegating regulatory authority becomes irrelevant to any cost-benefit
analysis. All resolutions would be equally satisfactory. If so, all regulatory bodies
should be directed to expend as few resources as possible in resolving issues and authority should be delegated on a random basis.
2 If this second factor is not accepted as inherently reasonable, it could also be argued as a matter of efficiency. Regulatory ability could be measured by freedom from
conflicts of interest between a regulator's self-interest and market regulatory goals regardless of whether the regulatory body would not capitulate to its self-interest in any
given conflict. Assuming the regulatory body's self-interest differs from the interest of
the trading markets and the regulatory body acts in its own interest, then its regulatory
efforts would be inefficient. Ultimately these efforts, motivated by self-interest, would
be inefficient because they would have to be corrected by the expenditure of additional
regulatory resources. It would seem reasonable to assume that self-interest will not
always be synonymous with overall trading market regulatory interest since the
financial interest of one segment of the securities industry will not always be in the
financial best interest of the entire industry. See note 67 supra.
On the other hand, if a regulatory body contradicted its self-interest and adopted a
regulatory mode compatible with the overall well being of the trading markets, it is
likely these efforts would also be inefficient. Considerable resources would have to be
expended by the SRO staff in educating its constituency and overcoming a natural
inclination of its constituency toward a maximization of self-interest. A self-regulatory
body uninvolved in the conflict would not have to expend such resources.
" Some students of management techniques might argue that there are inherent administrative or problem resolving benefits or drawbacks in either government regulation
or not-for-profit regulation. Obviously, if such conclusions could be proven, it would
alter the outcome of this article.
" To posit as a goal the avoidance of conflicts of interest does not necessarily ignore
benefits that can be brought to a regulatory process through the interaction of compet-
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based upon our initial assumptions, there is reason to believe that the
SEC will have a greater inherent regulatory utility than the SROs. The
SROs represent a membership which is composed of profit motive entities. The SEC is an independent bipartisan government regulatory
agency designed to be relatively insulated from the political process. In
relevant part, its mandate is to implement the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 uninfluenced by outside pressures."
With the goal of maximizing the utility of the regulatory bodies measured by the above two factors of efficiency, one could posit the following guidelines for allocating regulatory responsibility when dual authority exists:76
1. Decisions requiring technical expertise should be resolved by the
regulatory institution with the greatest expertise. All else being equal,
if a regulatory problem requires certain expertise possessed by only one
institution, that institution would need to expend fewer resources in
satisfactorily resolving the regulatory problem than the institution without that expertise.
2. Decisions involving conflicts of interest between the self-interests
of a regulatory party and a specific regulatory goal should be resolved
by the regulatory institution not involved in the conflict. As a practical
matter, this particular criterion addresses the quality of a resolution to
a specific issue as much as it addresses the efficiency of the process by
which that resolution is achieved. Regulatory institutions resolving issues involving matters for which they have a self-interest that conflicts
with regulatory goals are probably more apt to adopt a resolution not
in the overall best interest of the trading markets than are institutions
unaffected by the conflict. A resolution not in the best interests of the
trading markets is inefficient because (i) it may not achieve all regulatory goals; and (ii) it may require the additional expenditure of corrective efforts.
3. Decisions requiring uniformity of approach for different SROs
should be administered by the SEC. This is a variation of the second
criterion. It avoids unnecessary expenditure of resources in reconciling
conflicting interests. It also avoids the unnecessary expenditure of reing interests. In most instances, the SEC's decision making process allows input from
competing interests during either a formal comment period or informal negotiations.
Thus, the positions of the various parties to an issue can be argued before the Commission, but the Commission is unlikely to hold the position itself based merely on selfinterest.
"' See note 68 supra.
76 The criteria enumerated in the text are not exhaustive of all of the factors relevant
to allocating decision making responsibility.
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sources in reconciling conflicting regulatory proposals that might not be
so much reflective of self-interests, but rather reflective merely of different regulatory language, drafting techniques, or regulatory approaches.
The application of the criterion does not eliminate expenditure of resources necessary to create a resolution that would accommodate multiple trading market frameworks. However, it allows a problem for
which each constituency might be motivated by its own self-interest, to
be resolved by an entity that need only consider the well being of the
collective trading markets.
For example, assume there is a need for a uniform "suitability" rule
allowing investors dealing with any broker in any market to know the
responsibilities of a broker in recommending securities to the investor."
Each SRO might have its own resolution of the suitability rule question
based upon certain self-interest. An SRO influenced by securities firms
doing primarily a "retail" business might have a far more protective
posture in framing a suitability rule than would an SRO influenced by
firms doing other than primarily retail business. Assuming the need for
a uniform rule, requiring various SROs to work together to forge one
suitability rule would most likely be wasteful of resources because
much time would be devoted to reconciling conflicting interests rather
than examining the needs of the trading markets. Time would also be
spent compromising language and regulatory approach. These resources would not need to be expended if an entity removed from the
conflict, specifically the SEC, resolved the problem.
4. Decisions requiring diversity of approach for each SRO based
upon differences in market structure should be administered by the individual SRO. This is a variation of the first criterion. Each SRO has a
slightly different market structure. If the regulatory problem being confronted is to be resolved with solutions unique to each market, each
SRO would be most familiar with the unique trading structure and
needs of its own market, and thus, should resolve the issue individually.
For the SEC to attempt resolution of the issue for each market would
require the expenditure of resources necessary to understand the
unique structure of each market in regard to the specific regulatory
" Suitability rules are designed to assure that investment recommendations made by
brokers are appropriate for the financial situation and investment objectives of the broker's clients. For example, the NASD's suitability rule requires brokers, in recommending securities to a customer, to have "reasonable grounds for believing that the
recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs." NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS MANUAL (CCH),
NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III § 2, 1 2152 (1982).
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problem. As an example, assume that regulatory need exists to develop
or augment the affirmative duties of specialists.78 Also assume that the
regulatory resolution would not need to be uniform, but rather would
be intended to consider the unique qualities of each trading market. 9
Rather than require the SEC to familiarize itself with the operation of
each exchange in terms of this particular problem, resources would be
used more efficiently if the individual exchanges devised their own specialist rules.
5. The Commission should resolve a problem when it has ultimate
regulatory authority over a regulatory issue80 and has already decided
upon a specific resolution for which it needs no further technical assistance. This last criterion is a variation of the adage "if you already
know the answer, don't ask the question." It wastes resources and
duplicates efforts to allow SROs to attempt to resolve problems the resolutions of which are essentially piedetermined.
B.

Qualifications of the Allocating Guidelines

Obviously, different allocating guidelines applied separately to the
same problem will not always provide consistent resolutions. For example, if the Commission knows the goal it wants to reach regarding a
specific regulatory problem, it would normally be wasteful of resources
to have the SROs attempt a resolution. On the other hand, if the resolution in question is not to be uniform, but is intended to match the
needs of the individual trading markets, then the solution should come
from the SROs. These contradictory messages can both be satisfied if
the SEC were to use its indirect authority to dictate a goal and then
allow the SROs to use their familiarity with their respective trading
markets in determining how best to effectuate that goal in their market.8 ' In other instances, resolution of the conflicting messages might be
" These duties basically require specialists to maintain fair and orderly markets.
See, e.g., NYSE Rule 104.10, 2 NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE CONSTITUTION AND
RULES (CCH) 12104.10 (1981). At present, only the NYSE and the AMEX are required to impose affirmative duties on their specialists. Securities Exchange Act Rel.
No. 15575 (Nov. 23, 1964).
" For instance, some exchanges have a unitary specialist system, others have a competing specialist system. Affirmative duty rules for unitary specialists might well be
different from similar rules for competing specialists.
"0The Senate Report accompanying the 1975 Amendments emphasized that ultimate regulatory authority rested with the SEC. The SROs were seen as having "no
authority to regulate independently of the SEC's control." 1975 SENATE REPORT, supra
I
note 12, at 23.

"

The indirect authority the Commission may use could be an informal employment
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more difficult.
The allocating guidelines are designed for a field of joint authority
embracing many matters for which no explicit guidelines exist. They
are simple in structure, and not intended to be comprehensive in providing guidance for allocating regulatory responsibilities. Even with
their simple design, however, application often requires a subjective interpretation of a regulatory problem. Different interpretations of the
same problem might produce different recommendations regarding the
identity of the regulatory body best equipped to resolve a problem.
Questions of values are also raised in determining which self-interests
are compatible with market regulatory goals and which self-interests
conflict, or in determining when a uniform resolution is desirable and
when it is not.
Creation of these allocating guidelines based upon maximizing the
utility of regulatory bodies does not ignore subtle regulatory concerns
that might be contrary to utility principles. The drafters of the 1934
Act were sensitive to avoid SEC domination of the exchanges," recognizing that such a relationship might deprive the SROs of the initiative
and responsibility to take care of their own problems.83 Furthermore,
the SROs often are responsible for enforcing regulations adopted by the
Commission. Effective SRO enforcement might be encouraged by SRO
participation in the regulation formulating process. The concern with
placing too much responsibility in the hands of the SEC remains valid
today. Therefore, the guidelines are based on the assumption that daily
administration of the trading markets will remain with the SROs, thus
leaving them with considerable unshared basic authority. Furthermore,
regarding significant regulatory problems, responsibility for which
would be allocated by means of the criteria, there is no reason to believe that the SEC would assume an expanded role in regulating the
securities markets. The criteria would not necessarily increase or decrease the workload of the SEC. Responsibilities, however, might be
of its direct authority. See text accompanying note 34 supra. The Commission would
essentially say to the SROs, "Here's the result that is desired. Either you adopt the
appropriate rules or we will."
2 This concern was limited to domination only of the exchanges because the NASD
was not in existence in 1934. The NASD became a registered national securities association in August, 1979.
"' Letter from the President of the United States to the Chairman of the Committee
on Banking and Currency with an Accompanying Report Relative to Stock Exchange
Regulation, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (Comm. print 1934). This report, by Secretary of
Commerce Roper, was the basis of the 1934 legislation. It is commonly referred to as
the "Roper Report."
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allocated differently than they are currently.
When applying the guidelines, it should not be overlooked that even
when regulatory problems exist, the time is not always ripe to devise
regulatory solutions. Some problems need to percolate within the securities industry before resolutions are attempted. For these problems, it
might be unrealistic to assess in advance with whom regulatory responsibility should ultimately rest. In those cases, the best course might be
to place the issue in abeyance either by all parties refraining from assuming responsibility, or perhaps by an assumption or assignment of
responsibility with an unusually lengthy deadline. Alternatively, responsibility might be assumed by or assigned to one regulatory body for
a period of time to allow ideas to germinate. After some ideas are produced, it might be necessary to call on another regulatory body for
implementation." '
The creation of guidelines to allocate responsibility when shared responsibility exists in formal regulatory activities does not ignore the fact
that the Commission and the SRO do not always work through formal
means of authority. Many regulatory problems are resolved through
informal communications, joint discussions, study, bargaining and political activities. 5 Often these informal processes are appendages of the
formal authority possessed by the SROs and the SEC.86 In those instances, the guidelines might be applied to the informal regulatory
practices as aptly as to the formal process. If the informal regulatory
practices prove to be unrelated to the authority delegated to the SROs
and the SEC under the 1934 Act, it might be appropriate to develop
allocating criteria for the informal process. The proposed allocating
guidelines are thought of only as a starting point for the development of
a complete range of principles by which to allocate regulatory
responsibilities.
IV.

CASE STUDY APPLICATIONS

To appreciate how the guidelines might function, it is useful to see
how an allocation of regulatory responsibilities might have been made
for several regulatory matters that have recently confronted the securiSee, e.g., note 200 infra.
For two thoughtful discussions of the Commission's use of informal authority, see
Jennings, note 10 supra and Comment, note 34 supra.
86 Others have viewed the relationship between the authority granted by statute and
the informal bargaining process as one in which "the statutory provisions are merely
being used as an arsenal of weapons through which the SEC has bargaining leverage at
the informal level." Comment, note 34 supra, at 819.
"
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ties industry. These are matters for which regulatory authority was
possessed both by the SEC and the SROs.
A.

Options Study Recommendations

The Commission's plan to implement the recommendations of the
Report on Special Study of the Options Markets (Options Study Report) "7 presents a good opportunity to deduce divisions of responsibility
by applying the allocating guidelines to a case in which regulatory authority is shared by the SEC and the SROs. In response to abusive
practices in the trading of standardized options and the Commission's
sense that the registered options exchanges were unable to insure their
maintenance of fair and orderly markets, the Commission effectively
created a moratorium on further expansion in options programs," and
initiated a study of the options markets. The study resulted in the Options Study Report, released in 1979.8 Shortly after its release, the
Commission developed its plan to implement the recommendations for
regulatory reform proposed in the report.9" Only upon successful implementation of certain of the recommendations was the Commission willing to lift its options program moratorium."
Both the Commission and the various option exchanges possessed the
authority to implement many of the recommendations.92 The SROs,
pursuant to Sections 6(b) and 19(b) rulemaking authority, were in a
position to propose resolutions of various problems raised by the Study
" SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF
THE OPTIONS MARKET FOR HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1978) [hereafter OPTIONS STUDY REPORT].

The Commission's implementation plan was published in Securities Exchange Act Rel.
No. 15575 (Feb. 22, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,962 (Feb. 22, 1979), 16 SEC DOCKET 1163 (Mar. 6, 1979) [hereafter Implementation Plan].
8" Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 14056 (Oct. 17, 1977).
" Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 15569 (Feb. 15, 1979).
0 Implementation Plan, note 87 supra.
" Implementation Plan, note 87 supra, at 81,413.
2 One could argue that the question of who has the authority to initiate implementation of the Options Study Report is irrelevant. Because the Options Study Report was
a Commission Study, it could be said that the Commission initiated the resolution of all
of the problems raised by the Study. However, as a practical matter, some of the
problems were resolved by the SROs and others by the SEC. In almost all instances,
there was no legislative mandate for a problem to be handled by the SROs or the SEC.
For each instance in which implementation was allocated to the SEC or an SRO, a
rationale should exist for the allocation. It is this allocation to which the guidelines are
to be applied.
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for which approval or disapproval authority would rest with the Commission. On the other hand, the Commission possessed direct rulemaking authority to resolve numerous matters discussed in the Options
Study Report. Resolution may have been effected through the Commission's authority to specifically regulate options trading," directly implement exchange rules,"' or generally regulate specific trading oversight
matters."'
The Commission's Implementation Plan specified those actions it
would ask the SROs to take and those the SEC would take in response
to the Options Study Report's recommendations." Many of the recommendations involved routine operating problems of the exchanges." 7 For
these perfunctory matters, responsibility was typically delegated to the
SROs in accordance with basic principles of self-regulation." Other
problems involved significant policy decisions." For these matters, responsibility was occasionally delegated to the SROs and sometimes assumed by the SEC.
The Commission's basis for its delegation of authority was not identified in the Options Study Report. It may be instructive, however, to
examine one of the problems addressed, and determine what result the
guidelines would have dictated in allocating regulatory initiative.
The Options Study Report contained a series of recommendations
concerning the content and use of suitability forms. The possession of
accurate information about a customer's financial resources and investment objectives is critical to a broker's compliance with his fiduciary
obligation of making only those recommendations suitable to a customer's financial situation and needs.' 0 The Options Study Report disclosed that it was "not uncommon to find inaccurate suitability infor9 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 9(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (1976).
" Id. § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1976).
" For example, the Commission has authority to regulate record making and keeping by the SROs and brokers. Id. § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(b) (1976).
"6 Implementation Plan, note 87 supra. The Commission also sub-categorized the
problems to be resolved by time periods in which a resolution was to be achieved. For
example, some problems were to be resolved before the options moratorium would be
lifted and some thereafter. Id.
" For example, the exchanges were directed to retain written records of oral customer complaints and revise account selection procedures when conducting routine examinations to insure valid random selection of accounts. (1979 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,962 at 81,418, Proposals I(B)(1)(g) and I(B)(1)(b).
" See text accompanying notes 58-65 supra.
",See, e.g., notes 100-106 and accompanying text infra.
,09For a general discussion of a broker's suitability duties, see N. WOLFSON, note 11
supra, at 1 2.08.
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mation about a customer contained in the files of broker dealer
firms."'' The Report recommended that (i) suitability reports be standardized and brokerage firms adopt procedures to insure that all suitability information be properly recorded;" 2 (ii) information collected on
options forms be verified by the options customer; °3 and (iii) brokerage
firms semi-annually0 4 confirm the currency of suitability information
with the customer.'

The Options Study Report identified unsuitable options trading as a
"major regulatory concern."'0 5 As such, it may be categorized as a significant regulatory matter for which no presumption would necessarily
exist as to whether the Commission or an SRO should respond. Historically, both the SROs and the SEC have regulated brokerage firm information gathering and retention 0processes
similar in nature to the
6
matters covered by these proposals.
Implementation of each recommendation would require significant
financial cost to brokerage firms in return for, at best, limited short
term benefits to these firms.1'0 Thus, the self-interest of the brokerage
firms -

the constituency of the various option exchanges -

would be

in conflict with the market regulatory goals established by the Options
Study Report. This conflict of interest would suggest that the suitability
information recommendations would be best implemented by the SEC.
On the other hand, the expertise as to how to construct a suitability
form and to determine how to keep information current would rest
with the options industry. This possession of expertise suggests that
each SRO implement the recommendations. 0 8
'0' OPTIONS STUDY REPORT, note 87 supra, at 348.
"02 Id. at 354.

101Id. at 350.
204 Id. at 357.
,01
Id. at 337.
200

For example, the Commission's Rule 17a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3 (1982), re-

quires exchange member brokers to make and keep current records of business transactions with nonmember brokers, and NYSE Rule 410 requires member firms to keep
records of orders sent or carried to the exchange floor for execution, NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE, INC. CONSTITUTION AND RULES (CCH) 2410 (1981).
20, In the short term, conscientious attempts to keep current information might pro-

vide some investors with increased confidence in a specific brokerage firm. On the other
hand, it might be perceived by other investors as an invasion of privacy. In the long
term, improved suitability information might minimize successful customer litigation
against brokerage firms for unsuitable securities recommendations.
'0oTo illustrate that the SROs did possess specific expertise, the responding proposals which were developed by the SROs and ultimately approved by the SEC, in many

ways altered the recommendations found in the Options Study Report. For example,
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The use of indirect authority by the Commission could satisfy both
suggestions. Because the recommendations reiterated in the Implementation Plan were structurally detailed, the Commission would be able to
provide the exchanges with a specific indication of how the suitability
information form problem should be resolved. Constrained by the specific dictates of the Commission recommendations, the SROs would be
limited in their capacity to accommodate their own self-interests when
these self-interests conflicted with the outcome required by the recommendations. In addition, by directing that the exchange adopt rules to
work out details of the recommendations, the Commission would be
able to benefit from the experience possessed by the SROs. Thus, the
allocating guidelines direct that an efficient use of resources would be
for the Commission to utilize its indirect authority and require the
SROs to develop appropriate rules to implement the specific suitability
information form recommendation. In the Implementation Plan, this
was the Commission's approach.109
It is interesting to note that, to encourage prompt action by the
SROs, the Commission indicated that it would not lift its moratorium
on options trading program expansion until the SROs completed their
assignment.1 ° This limitation on expansion created an incentive for
prompt action by SROs. Thus, the SROs' interest was consistent with
the specific market regulatory goals defined by the Options Study Report. This positive self-interest works against conflicting self-interest
that would otherwise influence the SROs (such as the conflicting selfinterest of seeking to avoid the additional expense of implementing the
Report's recommendations).
Significantly, when matters were delegated to the SROs, the Commission requested uniform rule submissions from all of the SROs. '
This request for a voluntary cooperative response was not made for
reasons of efficiency. Rather, the Commission indicated that its resources were "not sufficient to permit it to respond to separate and vathe SROs substituted their own schemes for keeping the account information current
and did not rely on a semi-annual mailing to customers. See, e.g., rule proposals of the
MSE, art. 43, Rule 3, Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 16254 (Oct. 5, 1979), 44 Fed.
Reg. 59,974 (Oct. 17, 1979), 18 SEC DOCKET 612 (Oct. 23, 1979). The Commission
apparently appreciated the need to alter the recommendation and approved the proposals, Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 16695 (Mar. 25, 1980), 19 SEC DOCKET 994
(Apr. 8, 1980); Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 16696 (Mar. 26, 1980).
"0'Implementation Plan, note 87 supra, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 81,962 at 81,415.
11OId. at 81,413.
lil

Id.
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rying self-regulatory proposals to implement the Options Study Recommendations" in a limited period of time."' In fact, uniform submissions
might not have provided the most efficient regulatory approach. Uniformity potentially compelled exchanges to resolve differences arising
from self-interests. Such differences would not need to be resolved had
a uniform regulatory resolution been unnecessary." 3 It is quite possible
that, to some degree, the realities of limited SEC resources might have
compelled an inefficient resolution of a regulatory concern.
B.

Best Execution Rule

The SEC and the SROs also share regulatory authority over the policy setting/rulemaking question of whether to require brokers using the
national market system facilities to seek to execute public orders at the
best possible price. The concern that brokers obtain best execution is
related to the particular trading characteristics of our domestic securities markets and from the congressionally mandated goal of developing
a national market system."" With the existence of dual listings and the
granting of unlisted trading privileges, the same security is often traded
in different markets at variant prices."' Brokers have a duty to execute
customer orders at the best possible prices," 6 which duty has arguably
been heightened through the availability of certain national market system improvements.'" As a general rule, however, customer orders are
often routed automatically to a pre-selected market which may or may
not be quoting the best price at any given point in time." 8 This practice
,,2Id. In this instance, the Commission did not indicate that limited resources compelled it to delegate responsibility to exchanges, but rather that when the responsibilities were delegated, the responses needed to be uniform. In other situations, limited
Commission resources might compel delegation of responsibility even if efficient decision making would not direct such delegation.
I As an example, there seems to be no inherent need for uniformity in rules requiring member firms to keep copies of customer complaints at branch offices and headquarters offices. Id. at 81,415, Recommendations I(A)(I)(f).
'" See note 53 supra.
...For a general discussion of how dual trading arose on domestic securities markets, see Werner, Adventure in Social Control of Finance: The National Market System for Securities, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1241-44, 1246-53 (1975).
.,.See Lipton, note 39 supra, at 463-82.
Id. at 471, 474.
'" The 1975 Senate Report states that "[l]arge brokerage firms rely heavily on high
speed systems for the direction of orders to a designated facility for execution. The
[Senate] Committee has been informed that many of these systems are currently geared
to route orders for any particular security to only one market center, e.g., the NYSE."
1975 SENATE REPORT, note 12 supra, at 104. In 1981, the Commission confirmed that
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of not seeking best price executions works against the national market
system goal of competition expressed by Congress in 1975.119 Competition between market centers can only be sustained if brokers "reward"
competitive market makers by directing order flow to the market with
the best price."1

In addition, observing best execution duties is important to the efficient operation of certain national market facilities and rules. A central
element of the national market system is the quote rule'' and the composite quotation system.' The quote rule requires market centers to
collect quotation information generated during their operations regarding national market system securities. The market center must then
make the information available to securities information vendors for
dissemination to the securities industry and the public. The quotation
information generated is disseminated through the composite quotation
system, enabling brokers to route orders to markets providing the best
executions, thereby increasing the order flow to those markets. Failure
of brokers to seek best execution removes the incentive for exchange
members to provide, and for exchanges to collect and forward, reliable
quotation information. This lack of incentive prevents the Composite
this routing practice still continued, noting that retail firms "route their retail order in
[Rule 19c-3] securities to the primary markets." SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, A MONITORING REPORT ON OPERATION AND EFFECTS OF RULE 19C-3 UNDER
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 at 17 (1981), Securities Exchange Act Rel.
No. 18062 (Aug. 25, 1981), [1981 Transfer Binder]-FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
83,024 (Aug. 25, 1981), 23 SEC DOCKET 650, 660 (Sept. 8, 1981) [hereafter RULE
19C-3 MONITORING REPORT].
"' In the 1975 Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act, Congress found that
"lilt is in the.public interest and appropriate for the protection of investors and maintenance of fair and orderly markets to assure . . .fair competition among brokers and
dealers, among exchange markets, and between exchange markets and markets other
than exchange markets." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § lIA(a)(1)(C), 15 U.S.C. §
78k-1(a)(1)(C) (1976).
120 In explaining its plans for a national market system in 1973, the Commission
stated that it is "[tihe desire to attract business [which] provides incentive to a market
maker to bid higher or offer lower than his competitors." SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, STRUCTURE OF A CENTRAL MARKET SYSTEM, reprintedin 3 HEARINGS
ON H.R. 5050 & 340, BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON COMMERCE & FINANCE OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, H.R. REP. NO. 52, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 912 (1974) [hereafter 1973 POLICY STATEMENT].
12 Rule lIA(c)(1)-(l), 17 C.F.R. § 240.1lAcl-1 (1982).
2 The composite quotation system (CQS) is one of the communication systems
designed to integrate the competitive market centers of the national market system. The
Commission has described CQS as being "[alt the heart of the central market system."
1973 POLICY STATEMENT, note 120 supra, at 64.
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Quotation System (CQS) from operating as effectively as possible.' 3
Thus, the failure of brokers to consistently seek best price execution is a
significant regulatory concern because it not only denies investors the
benefit of the best price in specific transactions, but it also inhibits
achievement of the national market system goal of competitive markets,
and prevents the efficient functioning of essential national market system mechanisms such as CQS.
Both the SROs and the SEC have the authority to require brokers to
seek best price execution in their transactions. Specifically, Section
6(b)(5) of the 1934 Act requires exchanges to have rules which are
designed "to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanisms of
• . . a national market system."' 2 4 Pursuant to Section 19(b), exchanges
may adopt rules requiring brokers to seek best execution to facilitate
the goals of the national market system. Similarly, the Commission is
directed by Section 11A(a)(1) of the 1934 Act "to facilitate the establishment of a national market system. '"25 The Commission could take
direct action and adopt best execution rules for the exchanges pursuant
to Section 19(c).

2

,

It could also promulgate its own best execution rules

pursuant to the anti-manipulative provisions of Section 10(b). 27 Alternatively, the Commission could take disciplinary action under Section
15(b) of the 1934 Act against brokers who fail to seek best execution,
and thereby violate their existing fiduciary duties.' Finally, the Com,23 In order to comply with the quote rule, regional specialists have developed computer systems (commonly referred to as "autoquote" systems) which automatically generate questions based upon current quotations on the primary exchanges. These autoquote machines are frequently programmed to disseminate quotations at a fraction of a
point inferior to ("away from") the primary market. Although such quotations technically comply with the quote rule, 1) they do not encourage meaningful competition, 2)
they serve to clutter the CQS information stream, and 3) they add to a perception of
unreliability of regional quotations because these quotations are not always honored. In
response to these problems the Commission in 1981 proposed modifying the quote rule
to limit its mandatory application largely to the primary exchanges and those brokers
trading thereon. See Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 17583 (Feb. 27, 1981), 46 Fed.
Reg. 15,713 (1981) [hereafter Quote Rule Modification Proposal Release]. The Commission adopted these proposals in 1982. Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 18482 (Feb.
11, 1982), [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,098 [hereafter
Quote Rule Modification Adoption Release].
,24Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (1976).
,2515 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(2) (1976).
126Id. § 78s(c) (1976).
,2, A broker's failure to seek best execution could be an intentional misstatement of a
broker's implied representation to seek out the best market for his customer's transactions. See Lipton, note 39 supra, at 475.
2'

15 U.S.C. § 79o(b) (1976).
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mission could take indirect action by suggesting to exchanges that they
adopt a best execution rule, with the implicit threat that if the exchanges do not so act, the Commission will.
Using the allocating guidelines, the following observations! can be
made: First, regulation of the best execution question would place the
primary SROs in a conflict situation with their constituencies. Traditionally, the New York Stock Exchange' 9 and the American Stock Exchange' 30 have opposed a best execution rule. Although their opposition
has been cast in terms of cost and efficiency arguments,' 3 ' these two
exchanges are the major beneficiaries of the brokerage order routing
system that generally sends orders automatically to the primary markets.' 3" Also, the membership of these exchanges is comprised of several
major brokerage houses that have opposed a best execution rule.'33 The
opposition of these brokerage houses has been expressed in terms of a
cost-benefit analysis.'34 Again, it is difficult not to speculate as to
whether this brokerage industry opposition is based in part upon a concern with absorbing the cost of complying with a best execution rule.
For these exchanges to become involved with the best execution question in a neutral manner might require them to first counter the interests of their own constituencies. To the extent that the exchanges are
unwilling or unable to ignore their self-interests, they augment the possibility that their regulatory decisions will not serve the interests of all
of the securities markets.
Second, the Commission essentially knows the result it would like
,29 Letter from J.E. Buck, NYSE Secretary, to George A. Fitzsimmons, SEC Secretary (Aug. 24, 1978), SEC File No. $7-735a (copy on file at U.C. Davis Law Review
office).
30 Letter from Robert J. Birnbaum, ASE President, to George A. Fitzsimmons,
SEC Secretary (Aug. 22, 1978), SEC File No. $7-735a (copy on file at U.C. Davis
Law Review office).
131 Id.
,,2 On the other hand, the regional exchanges, which believe they would gain volume
were a mandatory execution rule in effect, have typically supported a best execution
rule. Letter from James E. Dowd, BSE President, to George A. Fitzsimmons, SEC
Secretary (Oct. 22, 1976), SEC File No. S7-648; Letter from G. Robert Ackerman,
PSE President, to George A. Fitzsimmons, SEC Secretary (Aug. 10, 1977), SEC File
No. S7-684; PHILADELPHIA STOCK EXCHANGE, REPORT ON THE NATIONAL MARKET
SYSTEM 20 (July 28, 1976) (copy on file at U.C. Davis Law Review office).
"' Letter from Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc.; Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co.,
Inc.; Dean Witter Reynolds Inc.; E.F. Hutton & Co. Inc.; Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc.;
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc.; Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co. Inc.; and
Thomson McKinnon Securities Inc. to George A. Fitzsimmons, SEC Secretary (Aug. 1,
1978), SEC File No. $7-735a (copy on file at U.C. Davis Law Review office).
t34 Id.
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regarding the question of best execution. With the adoption of the
quote rule in 1978, the Commission indicated it thereafter expected
brokers "to give careful consideration to [quotation] information in
making their order routing decisions."'' At the same time, in a release
that provided direction for the development of the national market system, the Commission went so far as to suggest the adoption of rules (i)
requiring brokers to demonstrate that they considered all market quotations before routing public orders; (ii) prohibiting brokers from using
order routing systems biased in favor of a particular market; and (iii)
prohibiting SROs from offering to brokers such non-neutral order routing facilities.' 3' Thus, not only did the Commission have the authority
to regulate brokers regarding best execution, but, it indicated how it
would like to so regulate the brokers, perhaps leaving only technical
details to be resolved by the SROs.
The best execution issue could not be assumed to fall under the category of non-significant regulatory issues that SROs might regulate as a
perfunctory responsibility. As discussed above, brokers' achievement of
best execution is central to the development of a national market system. The question is whether this issue with broad market implications
should be regulated by the SEC or the SROs. In light of the conflicts of
interests in which some exchanges would be enveloped in developing a
best execution rule, and the extent to which the SEC had already conceptualized a regulatory resolution of the best execution issue, the allocating guidelines would suggest that the SEC should assume responsibility for initiating regulation of the best execution issue through its
direct authority. If it were shown that particular market expertise
would be required to resolve how a best execution rule might function
in any given market, it might be advised that the SEC employ indirect
authority, perhaps by hinting at Commission direct action, and require
the SROs to develop resolutions that would conform to overall Commission directives.
The Commission has acknowledged its concerns with the best execution problem. On occasion, the Commission has indicated that automatic routing of orders to markets on a basis other than best price is
"I Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 14415 (Jan. 26, 1978), 43 Fed. Reg. 4,342,
4,347 (Feb. 1, 1978), 14 SEC DOCKET 14 (Feb. 7, 1978) [hereafter Quote Rule
Release].
'36
Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 14416 (Jan. 25, 1978), 43 Fed. Reg. 4,354,
4,359 (Feb. 9, 1978), 14 SEC DOCKET 31 (Feb. 7, 1978) [hereafter Development
Release].
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incompatible with national market system goals.'" The Commission
has also implied that it has the rulemaking authority necessary to ensure that brokers achieve best price routing.' As a historical matter,
however, the Commission has consistently and specifically declined the
opportunity to take regulatory initiative in establishing a best execution
rule. In 1978, prior to the complete development of the Composite
Quotation System and of the intermarket trading system (ITS),"' two
mechanisms essential to brokers obtaining best executions, the Commission stated that it did not then believe it "reasonable . . . to require
brokers under all circumstances to route their customers' orders to the
market displaying the best quotation.""" Even in 1979, after CQS and
ITS had been shown to be viable and useful components in the national
market system, the Commission continued to refrain from considering
whether "order by order routing of retail orders to the best market in
size should be required in a national market system.""' The Commission based its inaction on concerns with the lack of development in
communication and execution systems linking the markets. The Commission thus hinted that the best execution issue was not ripe for regulation, although other Commission releases emphasized the importance
of obtaining best execution. Since 1979, the Commission has repeated
its earlier explanation for deferring adoption of a best execution rule in
response to suggestions for promulgation of such a rule.'42
The Commission's reluctance to initiate regulatory activity concerning best execution left the proverbial ball in the SROs' court. The exchanges assumed this responsibility and in 1981 initiated regulatory action designed in part to help ensure brokers' seeking best price
execution. The participating exchanges of the intermarket trading system proposed an "anti-trade-through" rule designed to discourage any
13 E.g., id.
1 Id.
13,The intermarket trading system, operating between the seven major national securities markets and the NASD, is a linkage system which permits executions to be
made in any linked market center by brokers physically present in another market
center. Thus, a broker can quickly execute orders in the best market even if the execution occurs in a market in which he is not physically present. See generally SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE INTERMARKET

TRADING SYSTEM: 1978-81 (1982) [hereafter ITS REPORT].
240 Quote Rule Release, note 135 supra, at 4,347.
242

Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 15671 (Mar. 22, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 20,360,

20,366 (Apr. 4, 1979).
124Quote Rule Modification Adoption Release, note 123 supra, [1981 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,098 at 84,096. See also Securities Exchange

Act Rel. No. 16590 (Feb. 19, 1980), 19 SEC DOCKET 639, 675 (Mar. 4, 1980).
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exchange member from executing transactions in ITS listed securities
at a price inferior to the price at which the security was being publicly
offered on any other participating ITS market center."4 3 The rule proposal provided that the initiating broker, who "traded through" at an
inferior price, assure that the public orders which did not receive the
benefit of the better available quotation (because the initiating broker
"traded through" such orders) be compensated by the initiating broker
as if no trade-through occurred. However, this proposed remedy applied only if (i) the transaction was for more than 100 shares; (ii) a
complaint was made by the market center displaying the order that was
traded through; and (iii) such complaint was made within five minutes
of the reporting of the transaction." 4
The exchanges proposed the anti-trade-through rule in part to "contribute to the best execution for public orders." The Commission approved the proposal in April 1981, ' demonstrating that it was not opposed to the general concept of a best execution rule for brokers, but
only that it was unwilling to assume the initiative in encouraging such
a rule.
The exchange anti-trade-through rule is a flawed substitute for a
best execution rule. As the Commission itself commented, the exchange
rule relies upon a complaint being made by the broker whose order was
traded through. W The economic interests of such a broker might not
warrant complaint even though his customer might not have received a
best execution.4 7 Second, in a busy trading environment, brokers cannot always take the time to raise complaints within the five minutes
alloted. Third, the rule does not really provide a mechanism for the
public customer to complain of a best execution failure because such
failure would rarely if ever be known to the customer within five minutes of its reporting. In addition, a customer does not have a personal
,, The proposal was made pursuant to §§ 19(b)(1) and 19(b)(4) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78s (1976). Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 17579 (Feb. 26, 1981), 46 Fed.
Reg. 14,876 (Apr. 3, 1981), 22 SEC DOCKET 195 (Mar. 10, 1981); Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 17671 (Mar. 30, 1981), 46 Fed. Reg. 20,345 (Apr. 3, 1981), 46
Fed. Reg. 16,770 (Mar. 13, 1981), 22 SEC DOCKET 658 (Apr. 14, 1981).
.4 See note 143 supra.

141 Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 17704 (Apr. 9, 1981), 22 SEC DOCKET 709
(Apr. 21, 1981).
,' The NASD, in urging the Commission to adopt a best execution rule, has argued
that the exchange anti-trade rules do not satisfy the need for such a rule because of
their "many exceptions." Letter from Gordon S. Macklin, President of the NASD, to
George A. Fitzsimmons, Secretary of the SEC (July 23, 1982) (copy on file at U.C.
Davis Law Review office).

"1 22 SEC DOCKET at 710 n.3.
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protest under the anti-trade-through rules. Finally, because the rule
does not apply to executions of less than 101 share orders, small public
order customers, which comprise nearly one-third of all transactions on
the NYSE, are denied the rule's protection.' 48
The anti-trade through rules have not achieved neutral order routing
by large retail brokerage houses. A year after the exchanges adopted
their rules, the Commission observed that "retail brokerage firms commonly route, on an automated basis, most of their customer orders directly to the primary exchanges irrespective of the displayed quotations
of the other market centers."1" 9 The rule also does not appear to significantly reduce the amount of trade-throughs occurring on ITS.' 50
Failure of the exchange initiated "best execution" rules to achieve
neutral order flow has contributed to certain inefficiencies in overall
market regulations. The Commission has recently concluded that its
goal of increasing intermarket competition for order flow by requiring
dissemination of firm quotations by market makers has not been
achieved.'51 This goal is a central element of the Commission's national
market system regulatory mandate.'5 2 Blame for not attaining this goal
was placed in part upon the non-neutral routing of orders,"' which
routing frequently contravenes a broker's duty of best execution.
The failure of the anti-trade-through rule to achieve neutral order
flow has also compelled the Commission to significantly dilute the effectiveness of a national market mechanism -

CQS

-

a mechanism

"I In 1980, 100 share orders accounted for 31% of all transactions on the NYSE.
NYSE FACT BOOK 8 (1981). This figure would probably be higher for the regional
exchanges, but comparable statistics are not readily available.
", Quote Rule Modification Adoption Release, note 123 supra, [1981 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,098 at 84,851. See also RULE 19C-3 MONITORING REPORT, note 118 supra, at 12.
"' ITS REPORT, note 139 supra, at 36-38. Trade-through statistics in this report
reflect the number of trade-throughs occuring as a percent of trades in ITS stocks in
four separate weeks during a year, each spaced three months apart. The average of the
selected weeks prior to the adoption of the anti-trade-through rule was .62%. After the
rule, the average, for the weeks involved, was .47%. However, these weekly statistics
appear to go up and down regularly with no certain pattern. For example, two of the
selected weeks prior to the trade-through rule had trade-throughs of only .47% and
.30% respectively.
,' "[Wihere regional exchanges have elected to compete on the basis of display quotations, that competition has not, for the most part, had any significant effect on order
flow patterns." Quote Rule Modification Adoption Release, note 123 supra, [1981
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,098 at 84,851.
," See text accompanying note 119 supra.
.,.Quote Rule Modification Adoption Release, note 123 supra, [1981 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 83,098 at 84,851.
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often considered central to the effective operation of this congressionally
approved national market.' 5 In February 1982, recognizing that order
flow was not responding to competitively disseminated quotations, the
Commission revised the quote rule and eliminated the need for many of
the market makers previously covered to continue participation in the
consolidated quotation system. The Commission essentially abandoned
its earlier held hope of including these now exempt market makers in a
competitive national market system.
It can be concluded that the exchange anti-trade-through rules did
not achieve neutral order flow as a best execution rule might have
achieved and also that absence of neutral order flow has lead to certain
regulatory inefficiencies. This, however, does not necessarily demonstrate that the regulatory authority allocating approach used for the
best execution issue was inherently flawed. At the same time it cannot
be ignored that the shortcomings of the resolution adopted by the exchanges is closely linked to the conflicts experienced by the primary
exchanges between interests of their constituencies and national market
system goals. Exchange member self-interest appears to have been opposed to a neutral order flow system and the anti-trade-through rules
did not compel neutral order flow. If indeed this conflict of interest led
to the unsatisfactory result, then allocating regulatory authority to exchanges, in this instance, proved inefficient.
C.

Anti-Internalization Rules

A final regulatory problem useful to examine is the implementation
of anti-internalization rules 5 to govern trading on the intermarket
trading system. This is also a matter for which initiating regulatory
authority could be exercised by the SEC or by the SROs.
The Commission adopted Rule 19c-3 in June 1980,"56 removing off"' In 1979, then Chairman Williams stated that CQS was a "fundamental building
block of the national market system" and that "quotation information from all markets
was prerequisite to providing investors with the ability to assure that their orders received the best possible execution." Joint Hearings on Progress Toward the Development of a National Market System Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations and the Subcomm. on Consumer Protectionand Finance of the House Comm. on
Interstateand Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 450 (1979) (opening statement
of Chairman Rep. Harold M. Williams).
"I When this article went to press, no anti-internalization rule had yet been
adopted.
,' Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 16888 (June 11, 1980), [1980 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,608 [hereafter Rule 19c-3 Adoption Release]; 17
C.F.R. § 140.19c-3 (1982).
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board trading restrictions' 57 for a limited number of exchange traded
securities.5 8 Although the Commission believed that the rule's adoption
would provide a valuable opportunity to observe the dynamics of intermarket competition in a limited context and unhampered by offboard trading restrictions, it recognized that the rule might also create
certain problems.' 9 For example, the rule would permit large retail
brokerage houses, choosing to make over-the-counter markets in Rule
19c-3 securities, to execute public orders "in house" as principal without exposing these orders to the buying and selling influence of other
market centers.' 60 This in-house execution, or "internalization" might:
(i) prevent customers from receiving the best price in their transactions;
(ii) have an anti-competitive impact on traders who do not have access
to large order flow; and (iii) draw volume away from the primary market centers ("fragment" 6the
markets) thus decreasing the pricing effi1
ciency of these markets.'
Although the Commision decided to adopt Rule 19c-3 in order to
limit the anti-competitive effects of off-board trading restrictions, it
cautioned that if "adverse effects" resulted from the internalization, the
Commission would consider certain remedial actions. It might require
that (i) off-board trading in Rule 19c-3 securities be conducted through
an intermarket trading system that would expose such transactions to
the orders flow of other markets; (ii) agency orders in Rule 19-3 securities be "held out" to other buyers and sellers for a specified minimum
period prior to execution; and (iii) firms be prohibited from acting as
-National securities exchanges have rules that limit the ability of members of an
exchange, to effect transactions as principals other than on an exchange in securities
that are either listed or admitted to unlisted trading privileges on the member's exchange. See, e.g., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. CONSTITUTION AND RULES,
RULE 390 (CCH) 2390 (1981). As a practical matter these rules effectively prevent
members from principal trading in listed securities in the over-the-counter markets.
These "off-board trading restrictions" augment volume on the exchanges, thereby increasing exchange revenues and arguably improving the quality of exchange markets.
At the same time, they obviously limit competition between exchange markets and overthe-counter markets in those securities that are traded both on and off exchanges
("third market" securities).
" In an experimental effort to remove burdens on intermarket market competition,
the Commission adopted Rule 19c-3, precluding off-board trading restrictions on securities listed after April 26, 1979 (date on which Rule 19c-3 was proposed). Rule 19c-3
Adoption Release, note 156 supra. These restriction free securities are commonly referred to as Rule 19c-3 securities.
"' Rule 19c-3 Adoption Release, note 156 supra, at 83,249.
,60Id. at 83,252, 83,259.
161 Id.
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both a broker and a dealer in some or all Rule 19c-3 securities transactions.1 62 These types of restrictions on off-board trading have come to
be known as "anti-internalization rules."
When the Commission adopted Rule 19c-3, the existing intermarket
trading system did not provide automated linkage, "interface" with the
over-the-counter markets. According to the Commission, the Rule 19c-3
experiment could not become truly effective until a linkage was created
between the intermarket trading system and a comparable system for
the over-the-counter markets.'6

3

Demonstrating the urgency that the

Commission attached to this matter, it requested a formal status report
on this linkage from the parties involved by September 1, 1980,64 less
than three months after adoption of the rule.
The then six ITS participants, concerned about the possibility of
order flow leaving the exchanges for internal execution by the large
retail houses, were unilaterally opposed to the linkage. 6 The NASD,
potentially a beneficiary of future losses by exchanges of order flow in
Rule 19c-3 securities, embraced the linkage. 66 The Commission
strongly favored the linkage and decided to forge ahead on the project.
In February 1981, it proposed an order requiring an interface by September 30, 1981 of the ITS and the NASD's automated trading system.' 7 Despite continued exchange opposition,'6 8 the Commission issued an order on April 21, 1981169 requiring the linkage to be
implemented by March 1, 1982, thus delaying the linkage five months
beyond the date intended in its proposal release.' 70 The exchanges
162

Id. at 83,255.

"3 Id. at 83,251. Such a system was being upgraded by the National Association of
Securities Dealers at that time. More than a year later, the Rule 19 c-3 Monitoring
Report also suggested that the linkage would benefit the rule 19c-3 experiment. RULE
19C-3 MONITORING REPORT, note 118 supra, at 41.
14 Rule 19c-3 Adoption Release, note 156 supra, at 83,251-52.
,6'In September 1980, the AMEX, BSE, NYSE, PHLX and PSE all sent identical

letters to the Commission opposing the linkage. The MSE sent a separate letter of
opposition. Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 17516 (Feb. 5, 1981), 46 Fed. Reg.
12,379, 12,381-82 (Feb. 13, 1981), 21 SEC DOCKET 1519.(Feb. 17, 1981) [hereafter

Linkage Proposal Release].
166 The NASD sent a letter in September 1980 to the Commission reaffirming its
support for the linkage. 46 Fed. Reg. at 12,382.
167 Id. at 12,379.
168

Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 17744 (Apr. 21, 1981), [1981 Transfer Binder]

FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) V 84,268, 84,275, 22 SEC DOCKET 845 (May 5, 1981)
[hereafter Linkage Adoption Release].
"'

Id.

1,0This date was viewed as an "outside date" to fully accommodate needs for implementation. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 84,268 at 84,269.
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maintained their opposition, arguing in part that linkage should be preceded by anti-internalization rules. They feared that the linkage would
encourage additional OTC market makers to begin trading "19c-3 securities" and to begin internalizing order flow."' In addition, the
NYSE raised the concern that by creating the linkage before addressing
the problems of internalization, the OTC representatives would lose
any incentive to work with the exchanges in resolving the internalization issues.'
Thus, by the time the Commission had decided to move forward on
what it viewed as a major regulatory goal - linking the exchanges and
the over-the-counter markets - it had been made aware of significant
industry concerns with linkage in the absence of rules dealing with
problems of internalization. It also knew that the exchanges perceived
their self-interest to be inconsistent with the linkage goal and the selfinterests of NASD. The Commission, at that point, might not have
been certain that internalization would be a problem;' but it.certainly
knew that the ITS participants thought otherwise. "4 The Commission
was eager to have the industry move forward on the linkage without
delay. It had already delayed the desired implementation date by five
months " 5 and it considered the continued absence of a linkage as "frustrating progress toward achievement of important objectives of the [Securities Exchange] Act."' 76
When the Commission ordered the linkage of the NASD trading system and ITS, it could have also assumed responsibility for the impleId. at 84,275. The NYSE argued that "the one fundamental rule which must be
required to precede commencement of any test linkage in order to preserve the-quality
of the nation's securities market for listed securities and the basic fairness of that market is a rule which appropriately addresses 'internalization . . . .' " Letter from J.E.
Buck, Secretary of the NYSE, to George A. Fitzsimmons, Secretary of the SEC (Mar.
13, 1981), SEC File No. 4-208 at 4-5. The Commission did not agree that linkage
would exacerbate internalization. Linkage Adoption Release, note 168 supra, at 84,275.
12 Linkage Adoption Release, note 168 supra, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 84,268 at 84,272-73. Letter from J.E. Buck, Secretary of the NYSE, to
George A. Fitzsimmons, Secretary of the SEC (Mar. 13, 1981), SEC File No., 4-208.

...
The Commission did not agree that internalization was a problem. Linkage
Adoption Release, note 168 supra, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

84,268 at 84,277. This seems somewhat curious in light of the Commission's concurrent reaffirmation of "its support of industry efforts to address internalization concerns
promptly." Id. at 84,278.
"'See

text accompanying notes 170-71 supra.

See text accompanying note 170 supra.
", Linkge Adopotion Release, note 168 supra, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 84,268 at 84,274.
"'
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mentation of an anti-internalization rule. The same statutory authority
upon which the Commission relied to require linkage, would have been
sufficient authority to allow the Commission to respond to the internalization problem. " Assuming responsibility for responding to internalization would not have required the Commission to act immediately in
implementing an anti-internalization provision." 8 At the time of the issuance of the linkage order, the Commission felt that internalization
concerns could not be properly evaluated or addressed until after the
linkage was effected.' 79 The Commission could have indicated that it
would assume ultimate responsibility for resolving internalization
problems, if they appeared, and could still have refrained from attempting resolution of the problems until the dimensions of the problems
became more clearly defined. 80
Instead of assuming immediate or eventual regulatory responsibility
for resolving potential internalization problems, the Commission chose
to allocate responsibility for this issue to the SROs. Twice in the
Linkage Adoption Release, the Commission reaffirmed its support of an
industry effort to "address internalization concerns promptly."'' Although the SROs might gain psychological benefits by self-resolution of
the internalization problem,' 82 the guidelines for allocating regulatory
responsibility would suggest that the SEC should have sought to resolve
the question of anti-internalization rules itself.
Compelling the SROs to resolve the internalization rule issue would
arguably result in one of two courses of behavior for the exchanges.
The exchange might have to expend resources internally to counter
membership self-interest and achieve a resolution of the internalization
' The Commission relied on §§ 2, 3, 5, 10, 11A, 15A, 17 and 23 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78b, 78c, 78f, 78j, 781, 781-1, 78r, 78x (1976) for
authority to order the linkage. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
84,268 at 84,283.
"' The Commission might have assumed responsibility for the matter and then
made a determination, after a satisfactory study, that an anti-internalization rule should
not be adopted. This nonaction would be fully consistent with an assumption of regulatory responsibility.
"' Linkage Adoption Release, note 168 supra, 11981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) V 84,268 at 84,275.
I,' The Commission had some fairly developed notions of how to approach potential
internalization problems. See note 162 and accompanying text supra.
"' Linkage Adoption Release, note 168 supra, [Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 84,268 at 84,275, 84,278 (emphasis added). This call for prompt consideration by the SROs suggested that an internalization resolution did not need to be delayed
until after linkage.
182 See text accompanying notes 82-83 supra.
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problem that would be compatible with the self-interests of the NASD.
Alternatively, the exchanges might resolve the internalization problem
in a manner consistent with their self-interests and then expend resources in negotiations with the NASD, which organization would be
motivated by competing self-interests. The latter course would probably
lead to inaction and delay on the internalization issue and the expenditure of resources needed to counter competing SROs' self-interests.
The Commission would not be subject to these self-interests. In addition, the Commission had a fairly sophisticated sense of what it wanted
in an anti-internalization rule when it ordered the adoption of Rule
19c-3'8 3 and possibly did not need the technical expertise of the SROs
in developing such a rule. To the extent that the Commission needed
refinements of its ideas, it could have either sought comments on its
proposals' or employed its indirect authority and required the exchanges to propose rules that would accommodate certain specified
Commission goals on internalization. As events developed, a number of
problems arose with the handling of the anti-internalization question
by the SROs. The continued disagreement among the SROs regarding
an anti-internalization rule caused delays in the fulfillment of the
linkage. The Commission found itself "troubled" that the concerns of
the ITS participants and the NASD over internalization matters were
hampering progress toward agreement on certain operational aspects of
the linkage not immediately related to internalization.' 85 These operational matters needed to be resolved before linkage could be effected.
Eleven months after the linkage was ordered, a securities industry
newsletter reported that "[allmost no progress on substantive issues dividing the parties has been made since the Commission ordered the link
text accompanying note 162 supra.
Ultimately, the Commission did seek public comment on anti-internalization pro-

183See
184

posals. Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 18738 (May 18, 1982), 25 SEC DOCKET 484

(May 25, 1982) [hereafter Order Exposure Rule Release]. These proposals were developed by the NYSE and the Securities Industry Association (the SIA) respectively.
The Commission can be extremely effective in soliciting public comment. In response
to its request for comments on the proposed order exposure rules, the Commission
received over 450 comment letters. Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 19372 (Dec. 23,
1982). This ability of the Commission to elicit public comment might represent, in
some situations, another reason for Commission assumption of regulatory responsibility. The Commission refined its proposals and again sought public comment on the
revisions, partially because of the large response to the Commission's initial request for
comments on its proposed order exposure rules. Id.
"'

Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 18536 (Mar. 4, 1982), 24 SEC DOCKET 1237,

1242 (Mar. 16, 1982) [hereafter First Delaying Release].

568
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last April [1981]."' These disputes compelled the Commission to delay the linkage again from March 1, 1982, until May 1, 1982.187
This delay proved inadequate and immediately before the rescheduled implementation date, the press reported that "[clontinuing industry squabbles likely will force another delay in the planned electronic
trading link between stock exchanges and the over-the-counter market."' 88 One week later, as an after-the-fact announcement, the Commission again determined it was necessary to delay implementing this
critical national market system component. 89
The inefficiencies associated with the implementation of the linkage
were not limited to delays. The reluctance of the SROs to effectively
resolve the problems they had with the linkage ultimately compelled the
Commission to assume responsibility for these matters and to initiate its
own resolutions. Thus, in March of 1982, at the time of the first delay
of the linkage order, the Commission found it necessary to propose its
own facilitating amendments to the ITS Plan"0 in order to promote the
linkage.'' Although the Commission's proposals reflected many of the
ideas developed by the ITS participants,9 the Commission's assumption of initiation authority at this point ultimately required it to duplicate many of the efforts and thought processes in which the SROs had
already engaged. This duplication of effort wasted regulatory resources.
Even the central question of internalization, responsibility for which
the Commission squarely placed with the SROs, was ultimately assumed by the Commission, 9 3 again duplicating earlier efforts. Not
,16I-T-S Link Delayed with New Internalization Rule in the Works, Sec. Week,
Mar. 1, 1982, at 1.
,' First Delaying Release, note 185 supra.
Wall St. J., Apr. 29, 1982, at 25, col. 1.
,a,Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 18712 (May 6, 1982), 25 SEC DOCKET 360
(May 18, 1982) [hereafter Second Delaying Release].
1,'The ITS Plan is the set of rules governing the operation of ITS. It was filed with
the Commission by the participating exchanges in March 1978. Plan Submitted to Securities and Exchange Commission for the Purpose of Creating and Operating an Intermarket Communication Linkage Pursuant to Section 11A(a)(3)(B) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, SEC File No. 4-208 (1978).
,',First Delaying Release, note 185 supra. The principal amendments that the SEC
proposed dealt with (i) requirements that OTC market makers maintain markets during periods of adverse market activity; (ii) order entry techniques into the linked system
by OTC market makers; and (iii) methods of reporting OTC trades. Id. 24 SEC

DOCKET at 1083-86. The Commission's proposals were adopted in Securities Exchange
Act Rel. No. 18713 (May 6, 1982), 25 SEC DOCKET 362 (May 18, 1982).
192 First Delaying Release, note 185 supra, 24 SEC DOCKET at 1083.

Order Exposure Rule Release, note 184 supra.

",
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merely were alternative order exposure rules proposed as a means of
responding to internalization, but the entire question of the advisability
of adopting any order exposure rule was proposed for examination by
the Commission. 194
The Commission did not necessarily view the efforts of the securities
industry as wasted. It praised the New York Stock Exchange and the
Securities Industry Association for developing general principles regarding possible order exposure rules. 9 The Commission stated that it
was basing its own two rule proposals on these principles and that it
was now time for the proposals to be given full public discussion.' 96
As a practical matter the two proposals presented by the Commission
for public comment do not differ dramatically in substance from those
that the Commission mentioned as possible courses of action two years
earlier when it adopted Rule 19c-3.' 9 7 In addition, if the Commission
was now assuming responsibility for the internalization problem because it thought that the securities industry proposals required public
discussion, that discussion could have also been achieved by the SROs
filing rule proposals, which under Section 19(b)(1) would have been
subject to a period of public comment.' 98
The Commission's action can be explained by recognizing that the
conflicts of self-interest between some of the SROs and Commission
goals were of such dimension that they impeded fulfillment of national
market system objectives. Only the Commission could operate without
" Id. This call for a total examination of the wisdom of anti-internalization rules
raised initially the spectre that the year-long SRO efforts to arrive at a satisfactory
anti-internalization rule would have been for naught. In December, 1982, the Commission reproposed a refined version of the order exposure rule containing elements of both
of the earlier alternatives. Securities Exchange Release No. 19372 (Dec. 23, 1982). As
of March, 1983, the Commission has not made a decision as to whether there will be
an order exposure rule, or what might be the nature of such a rule.
"' Order Exposure Rule Release, note 184 supra, 25 SEC DOCKET at 361.
296

Id.

See text accompanying note 163 supra. The most significant difference between
the Commission's earlier suggestions and the proposals it made based upon the work of
the SROs and the securities industry is that under the latter proposals, when the customer orders are held out in the intermarket trading systems, they would be held out.at
a price
of a point better than the price at which the Rule 19c-3 securities market
maker was proposing to execute as principal. To prevent the public customer from
losing the benefit of the price at which the market maker was initially intending to
execute, the market maker would have to guarantee the execution at least at the proposed price (i.e., he would "stop the order"). Order Exposure Rule Release, note 184
supra, 25 SEC DOCKET at 361-62. The central concept of holding out the order to the
general buying public was incorporated in the original Rule 19c-3 Adoption Release.
"' Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (1976).
'
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undue influence from these self-interests. 99 Had the Commission recognized the implication of that conflict a year earlier, it might have prevented the inefficiencies of delayed achievement of national market system goals and duplicative regulatory activities.00
'9, Shortly before the Commission made its proposal, the head of the SIA task force
on anti-internalization rules was quoted as saying that the Commission itself would
have to resolve the dispute over internalization, if it wanted the matter quickly resolved.
Wall St. J., Apr. 29, 1982, at 25, col. 1.
20 The Commission, in its defense, explained that the period during which the
SROs had initiating responsibility for the order exposure rules was productive because
the ideas generated by the SROs and by the SIA needed time to percolate about the
industry. Referring to the SIA's contribution during this period, the SEC said "[t]he
SIA's work constituted a step forward in the process of articulating practical methods of
addressing generalized order exposure concerns." Order Exposure Rule Release, note
184 supra, 25 SEC DOCKET at 361. The Commission characterized the NYSE's efforts
as providing "an important and concrete proposal addressing one aspect of [the internalization] issue and [they] serve a useful function in focusing industry attention on this
issue." Id. However, the Commission felt the SEC should complete the process. The
Commission appeared to concur with the NYSE's position that "because of the complexity of the issues and the differing interests of sectors of the industry, further progress in addressing internalization concerns requires the active participation of the
Commission." Id. If the Commision's analysis of events is accurate, then the allocation
of regulatory responsibility made by the Commission was not as inefficient as would
otherwise appear. It is possible that the industry indeed needed more time to work on
the proposals before they were ready for the Commission's final efforts. This analysis
would be consistent with the qualifications of the guidelines found in note 84 and accompanying text supra. The inconsistency with this analysis is that the internalization
issue was not thrust upon the securities industry with the adoption of the linkage order.
The problems of internalization were very much in the forefront of industry thinking as
far back as 1975, when Congress directed the Commission to remove all off-board trading restrictions. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 11A(c)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(c)(4)
(1976). In response to the congressional directive, the Commission called for hearings to
discuss several proposals for elementary off-board trading restrictions. Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 11628 (Sept. 2, 1975), 40 Fed. Reg. 41,808. Some of these proposals suggested the possibility of eliminating off-board trading restrictions for both principal and agency transactions. 40 Fed. Reg. 41,808, at 41,816. Thus in 1975, the spectre
of internalization problems was raised. As it turned out, Rule 19c-1, which the Commission adopted in 1975, eliminated off-board trading restrictions only for agency
trades. Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 11942 (Dec. 19, 1975), 41 Fed. Reg. 45,071,
8 SEC DOCKET 756 (Jan. 5, 1976). Again, in 1977, internalization was an issue in the
securities industry when the Commission proposed Rule 19c-2 which would have had
the effect of eliminating off-board trading restrictions for principal transactions. Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 13662 (June 23, 1977), 42 Fed. Reg. 33,510, 12 SEC
DOCKET 947 (July 5, 1977). At this point, the Commission went so far as to provide
specific proposals for the industry to consider to minimize internalization. 42 Fed. Reg.
33,525.
If the industry did not develop meaningful approaches for minimizing internalization
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V. SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES

It should be noted that in one instance the manner in which regulatory responsibility was in fact allocated was largely consistent with
what the criteria would direct. In the other two instances, the actual
allocation was inconsistent with the dictates of the guidelines. It would
be premature to conclude that in the two instances of inconsistent allocation the wrong regulatory problem solving approach was employed.
Unique factors, not accounted for by the criteria, might have necessitated the specific approach taken at the time. In those instances in
which the allocation of responsibility was inconsistent with the guidelines, however, certain problems later developed in the regulatory process. In one instance there was an excessive delay in achieving a regulatory resolution which affected other regulatory projects. In the other
case, the regulatory resolution did not conform to certain other regulatory goals, and in part, prevented the attainment of these other goals.
In both instances, the problems which later arose in the regulatory process might be linked to the manner in which regulatory responsibilities
initially were allocated.
CONCLUSION

A system of regulation of our national securities markets has developed wherein numerous elements of authority are shared by two institutions - the industry, the SROs and the governmental oversight body,
the SEC. There has not, however, been a corresponding development of
precepts to indicate which of these two institutions should assume authority to initiate the resolution of matters of significant regulatory
concern.
On the basis of specific efficiency concerns, this article has developed
guidelines that can be employed by the SEC and the SROs to suggest
which regulatory body should attempt to resolve which issues. When
the guidelines indicate that responsibility should be assumed by the
SEC, they can be further employed to suggest which of its several types
of regulatory authority the SEC should employ.
The approach developed in this article to assist in the efficient allocabetween 1975 and 1981, it was unrealistic of the Commission to anticipate productive
contributions in 1981. The Commission concluded, however, that the exchanges did
make meaningful contributions. In light of earlier discussions suggesting that the industry indeed did not make significant progress on internalization in 1981 and early 1982,
see notes 186-97 and accompanying text supra, it is possible that the Commission's
flattering assessments of the securities industry's contributions may have been made for
political reasons.
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tion of regulatory responsibilities within a specific self-regulatory
scheme -

that of the securities markets -

has ramifications for

broader self-regulatory questions. Similar criteria can be developed to
resolve whether an industry should regulate itself at all or be regulated
by the government. As with the question explored in this article, the
answers to these related issues might not be uniform, but, rather, might
vary depending upon the nature of the specific problem which the regulation would address.

